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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
laid down by Mr. Justice Washington, in Toler v. Armstrong, 4
Wash. 296, is so succinctly announced, that it is best it be given
in his own words: "I understand the rule, as now already settled,
to be, that where the contract grows immediately out of, and is
connected with an illegal or immoral act, a court of justice will
not lend its aid to.enforce it. And if the contract be, in part
only, connected with the illegal transaction, and growing imme.
diately out of it, though it be, in fact, a new contract, it is equally
tainted by it."
If this demand of twenty-five hundred dollars were allowed, the
dividends of the creditors, arising from the assets, would be
diminished that amount; and this without any fault on their part,
but wholly through the illegal dealings of the bankrupt and others:
Bankrupt Law, see. 22.
I may add, that the law, in allowing a guilty party to take
advantage of the illegality of his own act--as is here done by the
bankrupt-does so, not with a view of conferring a benefit on
him, but upon grounds of public policy, and also in this case, that
justice may be done to the creditors of Milner.
The decision of Mr. Register Murray is approved.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.'
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.2  -
AUcTION SALES.'
Agreement not to Bid.-The rules about judicial sales which make
void as against public policy, agreements that persons competent to bid
at them will not bid, make void such agreements alone as are meant to
prevent competition and induce "a sacrifice of the property sold. An
agreement to bid., the object of it being fair, is not void-. Wicker v.
Happock, 6 Wall.
BROKER. See Stock.
CHECKS.
Arot an Assignment of Funds.-Ohecks drawn in the ordinaiy general
I From J. William Wallace, Esq.; to appear in Vol. 6 of his Reports.
2 Frori Hon. 0. L. Barbour: to appear in Vol. 49 of his Reports;
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form, not describing any particular fund; or using any words of trans-
fer of the whole or any part of the account standing to the credit'of the
drawer in the bank upon which they are drawn, but containing only the
usual request directed to the bank, to pay to the order of the payee
named, a certain sum of money, are of the same legal effect as inland
bills of exchange; and do not amount to an assignment of the funds of
the drawer in the bank: Lunt et al. v. The Bank of North America, 49
Barb.
-COMMON CARRIER.
S'pecial Damage-Practice.-In a suit against a common carrier for
not carrying a party according to contract, the allegation of a breach
"whereby the plaintiff was subjected to gr6at inconvenience and injury,"
is not an allegation of special damage: Roberts v. Graham, 6 Wall. -
An objection of variance between allegation and proof must be taken
when the evidence is offered. It cannot be taken advantage of in the
appellate court: Id.
Limitation of Liability.-Common' carriers of goods may by express
stipulation- limit. their liability for the loss of goods occurring from even
the negligence of their agents and servants; or wholly exempt them-
selves from such liability; aid the acceptance-by the bailor from the
bailee, in the ordinary course of business, -of a receipt for the goods,
containing such" a stipulation, creates a binding contract. But the lia-
bility df the carrier will continue, as established by the common law, in
respect to allmatters not expressly stipulated against: Prentice v. Decker,
49 Barb.
The putting into'the hands of a passenger, on receiving her baggage
for delivery at her residence, of 4 card containing a clause limiting the
liability of the carrier to a specified amount, except by special agreement
to be noted on" such card, will not, without further proof from which the
assexit of such passenger to the terms thereof may be implied, establish"
such a contract: Id.
Such a contract'relates only to the carrier's liability as- an insurer of
the goods, and imparts no exemption from liability for actual negligence.
And it applies only to deliveries to railroads and steamboats: ld.
- Who may. sue. -The legal title to wearing apparel and jewelry, pro-
vided by a father for the use of his infant daughter, remains in him,
notwithstanding the possession of them by the infant. And for the
purposes of an action by the father, against a common carrier, to recover,
for the loss of such property, the daughter must be treated as the legally
constituted agent of the plaintiff: Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Railroad Companies.
CONTRACT.
To Pay Afoneyz-Measure of Damaes.-On a breach of a contract
to pay, as distinguished from a contract to indemnify, the amount which
would have been received if the contract had been kept is the measure
9f damages if the contract is broken: Wicker v. Hoppock, 6 Wall.
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CRIMINAL LAW.
Warrant of Arrest.-It is never necessary to state in a criminal war-
rant the evidence by which the charge is to be supported. All that is
required in that particular, is to "recite the accusation." This require-
ment is satisfied by a statement which indicates, with reasonable cer.
tainty, the crime sought to be charged: Pratt v. Bogardus, 49 Barb.
Where a warrant,- issued by a justice of the peace, after stating time
and place, alleged that the defendant '1 designedly by false pretences, did
obtain from" the complainant "one sulky of the value of $30, the pro-
perty of * * * with intent to cheat and defraud" the complainant.
field, that this was a valid warrant upon a complaint for obtaining pro-
perty by false pretences, although the pretences used were not set out
therein : Id.
,Jurisdiction of Magistrate-is Protection.-Where, in issuing a
criminal warrant, a justice of the peace possesses, and is exercising a
general jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and not a special jurisdiction
over a particular offence created by statute, and- thereby restricted as to
the manner of proceeding, all that is required to protect him in so doing,
is that the evidence produced is colorable-something upon which the
judicial mind is called upon to act, in determining the question of pro-
bable cause: Id.
Where thd affidavit upon which an application for a warrant was made,
stated, in substance, that the defendant did designedly and by false pre-
tence, obtain from the complainant one sulky of the value of $30, by falsely
stating and representing to him that his own sulky was hard to ride in,
and that he desired the complainant's sulky to go to Albany, and would
return it the next week, but that on the contrary he shipped it from
Albany to Fort Plain, with intent to cheat and defraud the complain-
ant: Held, that this was colorable evidence, sufficient to call upon the
justice to exercise his judgment, in determining the propriety of i§su-
ing process; and that, having acted in good faith, he should be pro-
tected: 1d.
Effect of a General Verdict -A general verdict, in a criminal case,
is equivalent to a special- verdict finding all the facts which are well
pleaqed in the indictment: Fitzgerald v. The People, 49 Barb.
Where, -upon an indict iient charging the prisoner with having corn-
mitted the crime of murder in the firt degrbe, the jury find a general
verdict of guilty, the court is justified in pronouncing a judgment sen-
tencing him to be hung: Id.
lzdictment.-A common law indictment for murder is good and suffi-
cienti in form, to charge the statutory definition of the crime; i. e., the
premeditated design to effect the death of the- person killed, which the
statute makes an indispensable ingredient of the crime, is comprehended
in the averment of a wilful and felonious killing with malice aforA-
thought: Id.
DEBTOR AND OREDIOTR.
Fraudulent Sale-Liability of Purchaser with Knowledge.-A pur-
chaser of a stock of goods from a debtor confessedly insolvent, where the
purchaser knows that the debtor's purpose is to hinder and delay a pai
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ticular creditor, and also that if the debtor intended a fraud on his ere-
ditors generally, the purchase would necessarily be giving him fabilities
in that direction, is not responsible in equity (the sale being an open
one, for a fair price, and followed by change of possession), for any part
of the consideration-money which the debtor had applied to payment of
his debts; but is responsible for any part which he has diverted from
such payment: Clements v. Moore, 6 Wall.
Statements either oral or written made by the vendor after such a sale
are incompetent evidence against the purchaser on a suit by the par-
'ticular creditor to set the sale aside: Rd.
Charges of Factor.-The proper charges and expenses of convert-
ing a security into money are first to be deducted from the gross pro-
ceeds; and it is the balance only, which ii applicable to the discharge
of the debt: Sheldon v. Raveret, 49 Barb.
. This is especially so, when the creditor is also the factor of the goods;
he having a lien for all those charges, which cannot be diverted without'
his consent. The factor is accountable only for the balance, after
dedudting his charges and expenses: 1d.'
DEED.
What passes by.-1. and W. were the owners of adjoining farms;
that of M. lying between the farm of W. and the public highway. M.
conveyed to W.-a strip of land twenty-four feet wide, and extending from
the land of W. to the highway, "for a priate road." And the grantee
covenanted that the grantor, his heirs and assigns, might "have free
and full permit to travel the said road." The deed contained the usual
covenant of warranty. Hdd, that the deed conveyed the strip of land
in fee; the covenant on the part of the grantee, securing to the grantor
the right td travel upon the said road, being consistent with the assump-
tion that the grantee was to, and did, become the owner of the land,
reserving to the grantor merely the right to travel thereon Kilmer v.
Wi/son, 49 Barb.
EQUiTY,
Practice and Pleading.-A complainant in chancery cannot by waiv-
ing a verification on oath to the defendant's answer, deprive such answer,
when made without such verification, of its ordinary effect: Clements v.
.Atoore, 6 Wall.
In chancery when an answer which is put in issue admits a fact, and
insists on a distinct fact by way of avoidance, the fact'admitted is estab-
lished, but the fact insisted upon must be proved, otherwise the admis-
sion stands as if the fact set up in avoidance had "not been averred : Id.
In this case, three answers in chancery denying allegations made in a
bill, of fraud on creditors by an admitted conveyance of real property on
the part of an insolvent debtor to his wife through a third person, held
not to disprove the allegations; the answers being discrepant in strikind
particulars from each other, and, as respected the consideration, with the
deeds themselves; no proof being given of the mode of payment by the
third person (who, it was set up, had purchased the property from the
husband, for himself, and afterwards sold it to the wife on payment from
her separate property), nor any proof beyond the answers of her husband
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and herself and a previous statement of the husband, then Arranging the
transaction, that the wife ever had any separate property: rd.
EVIDENOE. See Debtor and Creditor.
FALSE REPRESENTATIONS.
As to Another's Solvenc.-Though an individual is not obliged to
answer inquiries in respect to the solvency of a third person,.yet, having
undertaken to do so he-is bound to speak truthfully, and is not at
liberty to suppress a fact within his own knowledge, bearing materially
upon the pecuniary responsibility of such third person: Viele v. Goss,
49 Barb.
Where the defendant, on being inquired of, by the plaintiffs, in regard
io the solvency of another, omnitted to state in his reply, the fact that the
latter was largely indebted to him at the time, and alluded to his indebt-
edness in such a manner as would naturally have the effect to quiet any
apprehension on that subject, and produce the impression that it was
quite inconsiderable; and within a few months, the indebtedness of such
third person to him ripened into a judgment which absorbed the entire
property of the debtor; it being shown that had the extent of such
debtor's liability to the defendant been stated, credit would have been
refused to him by the plaintiffs. Held, that the defendant was liable to
the plaintiffi for'the value of goods sold to such third person,. on the
strength of the defendant's representations : Id.
PRACTICE.
S etting aside Verdit.-Where the real question involved in an action
has not been presented, or determined,'the verdict will be set aside:
Burwehl v. Greatead, 49 Barb.
PROIssORY NOTES.
Defence to.-In an action upon a promissory note, brought by a per-
son who is not a bond fide holder thereof, he having assumed no liability
nor parted with anything as a consideration for the delivery" of the note
to him, any defence which could have been interposed by the defendant
to the note in the hands of the payee, is available to such defendant:.
Van Valkenburgh V." tupPZebeen, 49 Barb.
RAILROAD COMPANIES.
Compensatiun to Property, Owners.-A. being the owner of a nail
factory, together with the easement or right to carry the waters of a
creek across a certain parcel of land thereto, the defendant, for the pur-
pose of constructing its railroad, acquired by purchase a portion of the
land subject to such easement. The road being constructed in such a
manner, and upon such a grade, that the water could no longer be cod-
veyed to the factory across the land in a straight trunk, the defendant
took down the original raceway, and carried the water under the rail-
road track, in a new trunk built for that purpose. A. accepted the new
structure without objection, and used the water flowing through it dur-
ing his life. Beld, that such acceptance of the substituted structure
was in judgment of law a compensation for all damages sustained by A.
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in bonsequen~e of the removal of the original raceway: Arnold et dl. v.
The Hudson River Railroad Company, 49 Barb.
The legislature may rightfully authorize the construction of railroads
or other works of a public nature, without requiring compensation to be
made to persons whose property has not actually been taken, or appro.
priated for the use thereof, but who may nevertheless suffer indirect or
consequential damages by the construction of such works: Id.
The case of a railroad company acquiring its roadway subject to an
easement or servitude appurtenant to mill property, consisting of the
right to carry water across the land of another to the mill, is within the
above principle: Id.
If the owners suffer an injury by having the easement impaired, this
-is an injury which the property suffers in .consequence of the construc-
tion of a public work, under legal authority, and not the taking of the
property: Id.
. Such a loss is to be regarded as damnum absgue inj ur.a, except in cases.
where, by statute, compensation is required to be made: Id.
"" IRECEIVER,
Effect of Executing a Bond to.-The execution of a bond by the
defendant, to the plaintiff as receiver, is to be deemed an admission by
the obligor, not only that the jlaintiff has been iluly appointed receiver,
but also that the receiver is authorized to bring the action mentioned in
the condition of the bond: Scott v. Duncombe, 49 Barb.
Whin in an action upon such a bond, the defendant does not allege'
in his answer that the plaintiff his not been regularly appointed receiver,
it is not necessary for the plaintiff to introduce even the original order
appointing him receiver, or his bond as receiver :, Id.
Action upon Bond to.-The surety in a bond given to a plaintiff suing
as receiver, conditioned to pay any sum the plaintiff may recover against
the principal obligor, in that action, is liable for the amount of judg-
menth recovered in cases where the obligee is appointed receiver subse-'
quent to the execution of such bond, as well as for the amount of those
recovered previously: Id.
STOCK.
Pledge of.-A purchase of stocks, by brokers, as agents for another,
with an advance of money by the former on account of the latter, upon
condition that the principal shall deposit a margin of ten per cent.,
and deposit a further margin when required by the agents, is not to be
considered a pledge of stocks for the payment of a sum of money advanced
thereon, and requiring a notice of the time and place of selling the
pledge to make the sale legal: Hanks v. Drake et al., 49 Barb.
Ri.ht of Agents to Sel.-Under such an agreement, the agents have
a iight, upon the principal's failing to deposit a further margin when
required so to do, to sell the stock and close the transaction: Id.
But before the owner of the stock can be called upon, under such a
contract, to deposit any additional margin, the agents should give him
notice that his margin is diminished, and that they require a further
margin. And a reasonable time to comply should be allowed, before
the stock can be sold : Id.
